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Abstract
This paper uses the credit-friction model developed by C´ urdia and Woodford, in a series
of papers, as the basis for attempting to mimic the behavior of credit spreads in moderate
as well as crisis times. We are able to generate movements in representative credit spreads
that are, at times, both sharp and volatile. We then study the impact of quantitative easing
and credit easing. Credit easing is found to reduce spreads, unlike quantitative easing,
which has opposite effects. The relative advantage of credit easing becomes even clearer
when we allow borrowers to default on their loans. Since increases in default offset the
beneﬁcial effects of credit easing on spreads, the policy implication is that, in times of ﬁ-
nancial stress, the central bank should be aggressive when applying credit easing policies.
JEL Codes: E43, E44, E51, E58.
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Nontechnical Summary
In this paper we propose a strategy that incorporates credit frictions into what has come to be
known as the canonical model (e.g., Woodford (2003)). The model used by C´ urdia and Wood-
ford, in a series of recent papers, serves as the basis for attempting to mimic the behavior of
credit spreads during moderate as well as crisis times. Next, we consider some experiments to
determine the impact of two approaches to monetary policy making implemented during the
recent global ﬁnancial crisis, namely, quantitative easing and credit easing. It is found that their
impact on credit spreads is dissimilar and this suggests that policy makers need to be able to
quickly identify the source of the ﬁnancial shock if they are to successfully address extreme
stresses to the ﬁnancial system. It is also worth noting that debt dynamics in the model are such
that total credit to GDP in the economy is not as persistent as it is in the realized data. Alter-
natively, we may wish to modify the intermediation cost technology to permit intermediaries
to fail, or households to default on their loans. Failing that, alternative proxies for the largely
unobservable intermediation costs should be considered. Changing the inﬂation target in the
version of the Taylor rule used here is another modiﬁcation we could make. Finally, the current
exercise would be more meaningful still by asking whether, if the results derived here are taken
to the data, there is support for the interpretation of credit spreads put forward in this paper.Financial Frictions and Credit Spreads 3
1. Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis, which began in earnest in the summer of 2007, has exposed the need
for macroeconomic analysis to more explicitly embed imperfections, notably ﬁnancial frictions,
into the canonical macro model that many academics and policy makers routinely employ in
policy analysis. While the weaknesses of the canonical model (Woodford (2003)) are well-
known (e.g., Goodhart (2008), Tovar (2008), Chari et al. (2009)), the profession has not yet
given up on this approach to the analysis of monetary policy.1 For example, Goodfriend and
McCallum (2007) show that an otherwise standard optimizing model, variants of which are
now the staple of models used by central banks in policy analysis, is capable of explaining
credit spreads. Understanding movements in these spreads, and their behavior in response both
to shocks and to policies, is considered to be a central element in modeling the role of ﬁnancial
markets in the macroeconomy (e.g., see also Graeve (2008)). Moreover, it has been known for
some time that the credit channel plays a critical role in the monetary policy transmission mech-
anism (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995)).Consequently, ﬁnancial frictions, as reﬂected
in interest rate spreads, can also have large economic effects, as the ongoing ﬁnancial crisis
clearly demonstrates.
Walsh (2009) points out that a good understanding of the “factors that generate movements
in spreads, or the degree to which these movements reﬂect inefﬁcient ﬂuctuations that call for
policy responses” still eludes us. In this paper we focus on trying to model the behavior of
credit spreads in a DSGE model with ﬁnancial frictions. Financial frictions come in many
forms. One view is that creditors are reluctant to lend for fear of not being repaid. Another type
of friction shows up as spreads remaining high because debt is undervalued. Hence, lenders are
not making loans that they would otherwise have made. Either way, there is a cost associated
with the lending activity, such as the cost of initiating and monitoring lending activity, which is
assumed, for the purposes of this paper, to be reﬂected in the spread. It may be too much to ask,
ofcourse, foramodiﬁedconsensusmodeltobecapableoffullyreplicatingmovementsinactual
credit spreads. Even if we are reasonably successful in explaining a good deal of what moves
credit spreads during calm and turbulent times there is always the possibility that the events of
2007–2009 are unlike previous ﬁnancial crises (e.g., see Cecchetti et al. (2009)). Indeed, recent
evidence (e.g., see Gilchrist et al. (2009)) highlights the fact that standard proxies for the credit
spread, suchastheonesusedinthispaper, neednotyieldthegreatestpredictivepowerforfuture
economic activity. Nevertheless, it is also clear that monitoring and understanding movements
increditspreadsmaywellbeanindirectcontributingfactorinproposalsforreformingmonetary
and ﬁnancial policies going forward. For example, Siegel (2010) points out that markets were
indeed suspicious of the quality of mortgage backed securities and this was reﬂected in the
behavior of spreads between high quality mortgage securities and corporate bonds in advance
of the outbreak of the latest ﬁnancial crisis. Therefore, while attempts to make the connection
between ﬁnancial frictions and credit spreads are unlikely to be able to capture idiosyncratic
elements present in any ﬁnancial crisis, the stylized model proposed in this paper can replicate
the kinds of sharp movements and volatility that were observed in some credit spreads that
policy makers have highlighted in describing the global ﬁnancial crisis.
Figure 1 provides several illustrations of credit spreads, including the libor-ois spread high-
lighted by Taylor and Williams (2009). Also shown are the 10 year-3 month and the 3 month-
fed funds spreads, both of which are the staple of many macroeconomic analyses of the term
1 As Altig (2005) points out, not only do variants of the New Keynesian approach, whatever its faults, lie at the
core of models used by central banks, but also these models provide the necessary context to explain how monetary
policy is practiced.4 Ke Pang and Pierre L. Siklos
structure (e.g., see Melino (1988)). The Baa-Aaa and the prime rate-fed funds spreads have also
been used as indicators of ﬁnancial stress since they tend to rise during recessions.2 In spite of
differences in the behavior of these spreads they all display certain common features, notably
large changes in the levels particularly beginning around 2008, reﬂecting the rising stress in
credit markets, culminating in sudden movements prompted by large shocks to the ﬁnancial
system in the aftermath of the failure of Lehman Brothers.3
The aim of this paper then is to apply a simple macro model with ﬁnancial frictions to replicate
actual movements in credit spreads. We adopt the basic credit-friction model developed by
C´ urdia and Woodford (2009a,b,c, 2010). However, we assume that the policy authorities use
an optimizing model where the policy instrument is adjusted so that the central bank effectively
hits a desired inﬂation rate at an appropriate horizon. The goal is reached because the central
bank operates on the basis of optimal policy projections which asymptotically approach a steady
state (see Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), or Svensson and Tetlow (2005)). As a result, the
policy instrument becomes an implicit function of current information. This keeps the model
tractable.
The assumptions in the C´ urdia and Woodford framework that agents are heterogeneous, that
credit frictions exist, and that central bank policies should be identiﬁed according to whether or
not the composition of its balance sheet is affected, are especially appealing under the current
circumstances. Nevertheless, a few other modiﬁcations to the C´ urdia and Woodford framework
are also introduced to enable us to focus more directly on the question of explaining movements
in a credit spread. In particular, we solve the model numerically (using a nonlinear method).
Also, actual time series for the exogenous driving forces are used to generate a time series pat-
tern for the simulated credit spread. More importantly, we add default risk to the model, in
recognition of the possibility that the ﬁnancial market seizes up from time to time because there
is a change in loan default rates. Once the model is outlined, and its equilibrium conditions are
derived, we then ask two policy relevant questions. Can a simple credit-friction model explain
the credit spread observed in the data? To what extent are these spreads driven by the exoge-
nous shocks in our model or the intermediation costs that drive a wedge between borrowing
and lending rates? We next consider the following policy exercises: how can monetary policy
inﬂuence such spreads? More precisely, what are the qualitative differences between quantita-
tive easing (QE) and credit easing (CE) policies? According to Bernanke (2009), quantitative
easing amounts to actions that center on the liabilities of the central bank. In contrast, credit
easing policies focus on the composition of the asset side of the central bank’s balance sheet.
In the present context, credit easing takes place through an increase in the central bank’s direct
lending to households. Insights about the impact of quantitative easing are obtained by con-
sidering an injection of bank reserves. The results reveal that the short-run impact of credit
easing and quantitative easing policies are almost diametrically opposite to each other. In the
long run, however, the differences between the two policies are more modest, but they still favor
the credit easing policy. While a more conclusive policy assessment awaits further reﬁnements
to the model, our results go part way to fulﬁlling one of the ’homework assignments’ Kohn
(2010), former Vice-Chair of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve, challenged
the profession to tackle in future. Our model also shows that quantitative easing need not be
inﬂationary, though this is likely because the inﬂation target in our model is always met and,
hence, is credible in the steady state.
2 Recessions are represented by the shaded areas in the various ﬁgures and the dates are from the NBER reference
cycle chronology.
3 The vertical dashed lines represent a demarcation point as some of the data used as inputs into the model to
simulate a credit spread are only available until 2004.Financial Frictions and Credit Spreads 5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the main features of the model.
The calibration exercise is detailed in section 3. Section 4 describes the solution and provides
an account of the model’s performance. Section 5 discusses the implications of quantitative
versus credit easing monetary policies. Section 6 concludes with a summary and suggests some
avenues for future research.
2. Model
Here we follow the basic structure of the C´ urdia and Woodford framework. The model is
mostly in line with the standard New Keynesian model, except that it features heterogeneous
households and inefﬁcient ﬁnancial intermediation.
2.1 Households
Households differ in their preferences. In a given period, each household can be one of the two
types, fb;sg, according to their impatience to consume. Type b households are more impatient
to consume than type s households. Each period, with probability  (0   < 1), the household
remains the same type as in the previous period; with probability 1 , a new type is drawn, and
thehouseholdbecomestypebwithprobabilityb andtypeswithprobabilitys (0 < b;s < 1,
b + s = 1).







where t(i) 2 fb;sg indicates the household’s type in period t. In equilibrium, type b house-
holds borrow, while type s households have positive savings in every period.
Householdscannotdirectlyborrowfromorlendtoeachother. Allﬁnancialcontractinghastobe
done through the ﬁnancial intermediary sector. For simplicity, we assume that only one-period
riskless nominal contracts with the intermediary are available for either savers or borrowers.
To facilitate aggregation, we assume that households are able to sign state-contingent contracts
with one another on random dates to insure against both aggregate risks and idiosyncratic risks.
The implications of this assumption are spelled out in C´ urdia and Woodford (2009a,b,c, 2010).4
Two factors in this model (heterogeneous households and ﬁnancial frictions) give a key role for
ﬁnancial intermediation. At the same time, the model is still simple and tractable. We further
assume that the random dates on which households have access to insurance are the same dates
on which a new type is drawn. Thus, with probability 1 , household i has access to insurance
at the beginning of each period; after receiving the insurance transfer, the household learns its
new type, and then makes optimal decisions based on its type and its post-transfer wealth.
4 In essence, the impact is that households’ expectations about their marginal utility of income is identical, regard-
less of their borrowing or saving histories.6 Ke Pang and Pierre L. Siklos









t (i) + Tt(i) (2.2)
where Bt 1(i) is the household’s nominal net wealth at the end of period t   1, [B]+ 
max(B;0), [B]   min(B;0). id
t 1 is the one-period riskless nominal interest rate that savers
receive on their deposits at the beginning of period t from the ﬁnancial intermediaries. ib
t 1 is
the interest rate that borrowers need to pay to the intermediaries at the beginning of period t.
Dint
t (i) represents the distributed proﬁts of the ﬁnancial intermediaries received by household
i at the beginning of period t. Tt(i) is the net insurance transfer received by household i at the
beginning of period t. Note that for a household which has no access to insurance, Tt(i) = 0,
while
R 1
0 Tt(i)di  0.
Household i’s end-of-period nominal net wealth Bt(i) is given by the household’s budget con-
straint
Bt(i) = At(i)   Ptct(i) + Wtht(i) + Dt(i) + T
g
t (i) (2.3)
where Wt is the nominal wage rate in period t. Dt(i) is household i’s share in the distributed
proﬁts of ﬁrms. T
g
t (i) is the net nominal lump-sum government transfer received by household
i in period t.
Each household i maximizes its lifetime utility (2.1) subject to (2.2) and (2.3). Household i’s








where wt is the real wage rate in period t, wt = Wt
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t is the household’s marginal utility
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t+1 + [ + (1   )s]
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The ﬁnancial intermediary sector is perfectly competitive. The technology of ﬁnancial interme-
diaries is given by
dt = bt + (bt) (2.7)Financial Frictions and Credit Spreads 7
where dt is the aggregate real deposit with the intermediaries at the end of period t and bt is the
aggregate real credit from the intermediaries at the end of period t. (bt) represents the real
resources consumed by the intermediary sector. All intermediaries operate on the same scale.
The distributed proﬁts of intermediaries are given by
D
int
t+1 = Pt[(1 + i
b




to (2.7). Let !t denote the spread between deposit rates and lending rates
1 + i
b
t = (1 + !t)(1 + i
d
t) (2.9)
The equilibrium spread is then given by
!t = 
0(bt) (2.10)
Clearly, it is the intermediation cost (credit friction) that drives the behavior of the spread.
2.3 Firms
There is only one good in the model. The goods sector is perfectly competitive. Firms, taking
goods price and wage rate as given, maximize their proﬁts
Dt = (1   t)PtYt   Wtht (2.11)
subject to an isoelastic production function
Yt = Zth

t ; 0 <   1 (2.12)
t is the rate of a proportional tax on the ﬁrm’s revenue. Zt is the productivity shock. The
equilibrium real wage is given by




Government runs a balanced budget every period,
t = gt + 
g
t (2.14)
where gt is the government expenditure to GDP ratio, gt = Gt
Yt , and 
g
t is the government transfer
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2.5 Monetary Policy
The monetary authority sets the policy rate (i.e., the deposit rate id
t) according to a Taylor rule:
i
d









; ;y  0 (2.15)
where  X = [;Y ] represents the targeted (steady state) level of the corresponding variable X.
Here, we focus on the steady state with zero inﬂation (   1).  and y reﬂect the stance
of monetary policy, and the relative importance that the central bank attaches to inﬂation and
output stabilization.5
2.6 Market Clearing Conditions





t + Gt + (bt) (2.16)






2.7 Dynamics of Bank Credit
The aggregate real credit bt from the ﬁnancial intermediaries is the state variable of this model.
It is important to understand how bank credit changes over time.
Integrating all borrowers in period t, their net beginning-of-period assets can be written as
Z
Bt




t + (1   )bAt (2.18)
where the aggregate beginning-of-period assets At of all households are given by
At = Pt 1[dt 1(1 + i
d













t   Dt   T
g
t ) (2.20)














[bt 1 + b(bt 1) + sbt 1!t 1] (2.21)
5 C´ urdia and Woodford (2009c) conclude that monetary policy functions are not improved by adding a proxy for
the credit spread. The contemporaneous form of the reaction function is also consistent with the standard portrayal
of the Taylor rule. Under the setup of this paper a more forward-looking policy reaction function would not add any
additional insights to the conclusions about the relative differences between quantitative easing and credit easing
policies.Financial Frictions and Credit Spreads 9
2.8 Equilibrium




t; bt; Yt; htg, and a set of prices
fid
t; t; !t; wtg, that satisfy equation (2.4) for each type, and equations (2.5)–(2.6), (2.10),
(2.12)–(2.17), and (2.21) given the aggregate exogenous driving forces fZt; gt; tg.
3. Model Calibration











 > 0; 









 > 0;   0 (3.23)
where  and  are type-speciﬁc preference parameters.  is the elasticity of labor supply.
 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of each type of household. In particular, we
assume that borrowers are more willing to substitute intertemporally than savers, b > s.
The intermediation cost is assumed to take the following linear-quadratic form
(bt) = 1bt + 2(bt   b)
2; 1;2 > 0 (3.24)
where 1 can be interpreted as the unit cost of initiating and monitoring loans. Moreover,
 ! = 1 in the steady state. The quadratic term captures the utilization cost of the ﬁnancial
intermediary sector. It is conceivable that any country’s ﬁnancial system has certain equilibrium
capacity. Running above or below capacity can, accordingly, be costly.6
The model is calibrated at an annual frequency. We set  = 0:9 so that the expected time until
a household has access to insurance is 10 years. We assume that there are equal numbers of
borrowers and savers, b = s = 0:5. In addition, we calibrate the discount factor  so that
the annual deposit rate is 4%. Normalizing s to unity, b is calibrated so that the two types
of households work the same amount of time in the long run,  hb =  hs. Furthermore, 1 is
calibrated so that the steady state credit spread is 2%.7 Finally, we calibrate the preference
parameters b and s so that the steady state debt to GDP ratio is 80%.8
Actual time series of the exogenous driving forces fZt; gt; tg are constructed using data from
Chen et al. (2008).9 Figure 2 plots the actual series of these driving forces over the 1960–2004
6 C´ urdia and Woodford (2009a,b,c, 2010) assume that (bt) is a convex function of the outstanding credit, i.e.,
(bt) = b

t;  > 0;  > 1. There are two drawbacks to this assumption. First, to generate the type of
movements of spreads observed in the data,  has to be very high, i.e.,  = 51:6 in their benchmark calibration
(the results are not shown but are available on request). Second, spreads have to be positive in the steady state. In
contrast, a linear-quadratic intermediation cost allows us to calibrate the model to any long-run level of the credit
spreads (even negative numbers), and, at the same time, replicate the dynamics of spreads using a much simpler
and more intuitive functional form.
7 For example, the mean credit spread between the yield on 10-year U.S. government bonds and 3-month Treasury
bills is 1:84% between 1984 and 2009. The year 1984 is chosen to avoid including the period when monetary
policy procedures changed at the Fed during Paul Volcker’s chairmanship of the FOMC.
8 W.l.o.g., the steady state (potential) output is normalized to unity ( Y  1).
9 We have used data from other sources, and the results are robust.  Z is always normalized to unity,  Z  1. To
obtain the TFP levels data we arbitrarily create an index set to 1 in 1959. We apply an HP ﬁlter to the log level10 Ke Pang and Pierre L. Siklos
period for which data are available. We set their steady state values at the corresponding sample
means. Table 1 provides the full list of parameters in the benchmark case. Notice that we have
set 2 = 1. The results are robust to the choice of 1 and 2 (see the appendix for sensitivity
analyses).
Our strategy is to compute the transitional dynamics of the credit-friction model, given the
initial deposit rate (id
0) and the initial level of private debt (b0). We obtain our solution by
numerically solving a system of non-linear equations. The baseline model can be reduced to a





t; t; !tg with eight associated
equilibrium conditions in each period. We allow 200 periods for the economy to converge to
the steady state. We stack all the 1,600 equations together and solve the resulting system for
the 1,600 unknowns. The sparsity of the Jacobian matrix makes solving such a big nonlinear
system practical. We calculate the close-form Jacobian and use the large scale algorithm of the
‘fsolve’function in Matlab to solve the model.
4. Solution of the Benchmark Model
We now show our basic numerical results. We report ﬁve sets of results: (1) the benchmark
case with all exogenous driving forces; (2) only TFP and all the other shocks set to their steady
state values; (3) all except TFP shocks; (4) only ﬁrm revenue tax shocks; (5) only government
expenditure shocks.
Figure 3 plots the model-generated credit spread against the observed spreads between the ten-
year government bond yield and the three-month government bond yield (upper left panel),
between the three-month government bond yield and the federal fund rate (upper right panel),
between the prime rate and the federal fund rate (lower left panel), and between the Moody’s
Baa and Aaa rated corporate bond yields (lower right panel). Recall that, in our setup, we can
simply change the shift parameter arbitrarily to facilitate matching the mean levels of the sim-
ulated and realized spreads. Hence, it is a simple matter to modify the simulations to lower
it from the steady state of 2% to some other historical average. For example, the simulated
spread could be reduced by a constant factor so that it overlaps the spread between three-month
government bonds and the fed funds rate (top right panel of Figure 3). Nevertheless, to ensure
comparability across estimates of the spread we retain the 2% steady state assumption through-
out. The baseline model does a good job of explaining the ﬁrst two types of spreads. Indeed,
simple regressions (see Table 2) of the actual spreads on the simulated spread suggest that a
1bp rise in the latter raises the actual spreads by about 0.59 bp. The model not only mimics
the variability but also is able to account for the level of the ten-year - three-month spread. The
model is less successful in replicating the behavior of the other spreads shown in the ﬁgure
except possibly for the volatility in the three-month - fed funds spread. The simulated spread
is inversely related to the actual spreads between the prime rate and the federal fund rate and
between the Moody’s Baa and Aaa rated corporate bond yields (although not statistically sig-
of the TFP data (using a smoothing parameter of 100) before obtaining deviations from trend. Other proxies for
TFP are available but these tend to be less closely related to output growth. An additional complication arises due
to the fact that the treatment of capital differs across measures and the Chen et al. proxy maybe more suitable in
modeling an economy with a ﬁnancial system.Financial Frictions and Credit Spreads 11
niﬁcant in the former). There may be institutional factors not properly captured by the model
which can partly explain this result.10
Figure 4 plots the model-generated credit spread with respect to the data when we only use the
TFP series as exogenous drivers. In this and the following counterfactual experiments, the other
exogenous variables are held constant at their mean levels during the sample period, which are
also their assumed steady state levels. Figure 5 plots the model-generated credit spread with
respect to the data when all exogenous variables except TFP series are used. Figure 6 plots
the model-generated credit spread with respect to the data when only ﬁrm revenue taxes vary
over time. Finally, Figure 7 plots the model-generated credit spread with respect to the data
driven by government expenditures. These ﬁgures reveal that, even though as shown in Ta-
ble 3 TFP shocks are the most important, followed by tax shocks, all shocks are necessary to
explain the levels and the variability in credit spreads. As Jermann and Quadrini (2009) have
also reported, productivity shocks alone can only partially explain changes and the volatility of
spreads. Therefore, either separate shocks matter at different times in generating sharp move-
ments in credit spreads or a complex combination of shocks is required to replicate the behavior
of credit spreads. If the latter is the more accurate description this merely conﬁrms the adage of
many central bankers, namely the need to look at everything rather than attempting to react to a
single event or shock, even if it can be correctly identiﬁed.
5. Credit Easing versus Quantitative Easing
Thissectionexplorestwootherdimensionsofcentralbankpolicyinadditiontotheconventional
monetary policy (interest-rate policy/Taylor rule). When a credit policy is adopted, the central
bank will choose the quantity of funds to lend to households. An increase in the central bank’s
direct lending to private agents is considered to be akin to a credit easing policy. Since a central
bank normally does not lend to households, at least not directly, this is how ’unconventional’
monetary policy is practiced in our model. A pure (narrowly deﬁned) credit easing policy is
one that changes the central bank’s asset composition while keeping the size of the balance
sheet unchanged. Central banks typically reduce the holding of conventional assets (treasury
securities) or receive treasury deposits to hold more unconventional assets (credit to the private
sector). Note that credit easing is effectively a form of a ﬁscal policy pursued by the central
bank. It is independent of the interest rate policy or other kinds of unconventional monetary
policies.
A pure (narrowly deﬁned) quantitative policy is one that changes the size of the central bank’s
balance sheet while keeping its portfolio structure unchanged. Until recently, most central
bank assets have been “Treasuries only”. Central banks expand or reduce high-powered money
(reserves plus currency) through open market operations (buying or selling treasury securities),
which essentially ﬁne-tunes the policy rate. The ability to vary the size of the central bank’s
balance sheet without affecting the policy rate guided by a Taylor rule or once the policy rate
reaches the zero lower bound, is acquired by paying interest on reserves. This gives a ﬂoor to
the policy rate and allows central banks to adjust bank reserves for reasons other than targeting
10 While changes in the prime rate are invariably tied to those in fed funds, they can be, and frequently are, changed
by individual banks according to other criteria. Since the early 1990s the 3% premium of the prime rate over fed
funds is a departure from its previous behavior, perhaps reﬂecting the improved transparency in how the fed funds
rate is set and changes in it are publicly communicated. Nevertheless, at the end of the sample, the simulated and
the realized spreads are approximately the same.12 Ke Pang and Pierre L. Siklos
the policy rate. More importantly, it strengthens the quantitative policy by providing an exit
strategy such that central banks are able to increase the policy rate to contain inﬂation even
when they have a greatly expanded balance sheets.11
Taking the decisions of credit easing and quantitative easing as given, we focus on studying
the impacts of such policies both at the steady state and in periods of ﬁnancial stress (when the
economy is hit by a ﬁnancial shock modeled as an increase in default risk).
5.1 Credit Easing
Here, we modify the benchmark model by allowing the central bank to lend to borrowers di-
rectly. Total credit in the economy is given by
bt = Lt + L
cb
t (5.25)
where Lt is the quantity of real loans made by intermediaries. Lcb
t is the quantity of real loans




t+1 = Pt[(1 + i
b
t)(1   t)Lt   (1 + i
d
t)dt] (5.26)
s:t: dt = Lt + (Lt) (5.27)
where (Lt) = 1Lt +2(Lt    L)2. t is the default risk. In each period, banks lose a fraction
t of their loans. Higher t means higher risk of default (i.e., more uncertainty in the ﬁnancial
market). For simplicity, we assume that   = 0 and  Lcb = 0 in the steady state. The equilibrium
spread can be rewritten as
!t =
0(bt   Lcb
t ) + t
1   t
(5.28)
Additionally, we assume that central bank lending also consumes real resources. In particular,
cb(Lcb
t ) =  Lcb
t . It is rather difﬁcult to measure intermediation costs, especially the cost
of central bank initiated intermediation. These costs are most likely not directly observable.
However, it is reasonable to think that the marginal cost of central bank lending is at least the
same if not higher than that of the private intermediaries (   1) due to lack of experience and
ﬁnancial expertise, among other factors that may determine these costs. As a result, the goods
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[bt 1(1 + !t 1)(b + s) + b(bt 1   L
cb
t )
+ b(bt 1   L
cb
t 1)   b(1 + !t 1)(1   t 1)(bt 1   L
cb
t )] (5.30)
The other equilibrium conditions are the same as before.
11 The foregoing deﬁnitions correspond to Bernanke’s (2009) differentiation of quantitative versus credit easing
policies. Moreover, the deﬁnition of quantitative easing appears to correspond to the Bank of Japan’s monetary
policy during the 2001–2006 period (e.g., see Shiratsuka (2009)).Financial Frictions and Credit Spreads 13
5.2 Quantitative Easing
We now introduce bank reserves into the baseline model. Quantitative easing typically refers
to an increase in the monetary base which, in principle, provides the necessary liquidity to
boost private lending through deposit expansion. Following an injection of reserves in the
banking system, private banks need to decide how many loans to issue and reserves to hold
while taking interest rates as given. In this case, the total credit in the economy is still bt. The
proﬁt maximization problem of the ﬁnancial intermediaries becomes
Max D
int
t+1 = Pt[(1 + i
b
t)(1   t)bt + (1 + i
m
t )mt   (1 + i
d
t)dt] (5.31)
s:t: dt = bt + (bt)   (R
cb
t   mt) (5.32)
where Rcb
t represents the injection of bank reserves. mt is the amount of reserves held by the
banks and im
t is the interest paid on the reserves. For simplicity, we assume that  Rcb = 0 in
the steady state. It is easy to see that the optimal holding of reserves equals zero, mt = 0, as
long as the interest paid on reserves is no greater than the interest paid on deposits, im
t  id
t.
Intuitively, banks will use up their reserves ﬁrst in this case because ﬁnancing loans using
























0(bt 1) + (1   )bbt 1!t 1g (5.34)
The other equilibrium conditions are the same as before.
5.3 Policy Assessment
We now consider the impact of various central bank policies on credit spreads. The results are
shown in Figures 8 through 12. The vertical axes are expressed in percent as deviations from
the steady state values for the parameters in question (see Table 1).
Figure 8 plots the impulse responses following a one-time increase in central bank credit at
the steady state, measured as 1% of steady state credit, Lcb = 0:01 b. This is the equivalent
of credit easing in our model. Spreads (!) are reduced, at least in the ﬁrst period, as is the
borrowing rate from intermediaries (ib). Although the spread rises in period 2, before returning
to the steady state, the cumulative effect remains a fall in the spread. How effective is credit
easing? For example, the impulse responses suggest that a 5% increase in central bank lending,
relative to the steady state, can wipe out a 2% credit spread. It is instructive to compare, for
example, the labor - ois spread plotted in Figure 1 against a summary of changes in the U.S.
Fed’s balance sheet (shown in the appendix). The largest reduction in this spread takes place
almost simultaneously when the credit easing policies of the Fed reached their zenith. Total
credit increases by over 0:7% in period 1, but central bank lending to private agents crowds out
some of the private credit (i.e., L decreases).14 Ke Pang and Pierre L. Siklos
Figure 9 plots the impulse responses following a one-time injection of bank reserves at the
steady state, measured as 1% of steady state credit, Rcb = 0:01 b. This is the quantitative
easing policy in our framework. Unlike credit easing, quantitative easing initially raises the
credit spread by a modest 4% (that is, from 2% to 2:09%), although, after three periods, the
cumulative impact of a quantitative easing policy is also reﬂected in a small reduction in the
spread. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the impact of a credit easing policy is almost ﬁve
times larger than for quantitative easing. Under quantitative easing the rise in the debt-to-GDP
ratio is far smaller than under credit easing. Finally, aggregate deposits (d) also suffer from
a fall and this is reﬂected in borrowing rates (ib). Clearly, the impacts of quantitative versus
credit easing on credit spreads are very different. More strikingly, total credit in the economy
increases in both cases at the beginning, but quantitative easing leads to a sharp contraction in
credit after the ﬁrst period.
Next, we consider the impact of a ﬁnancial shock, deﬁned in terms of a change in the loan de-
fault rate, and the policy implications thereof. Figure 10 plots the impulse responses following
a one-time increase in the default risk at the steady state,  = 0:01. Worrying that households
may default on their loans, banks lend less (by over 0:5%). Notice that a modest rise in de-
fault risk leads to sharply higher credit spreads. Not surprisingly, of course, borrowing rates
also rise. Aggregate deposits and credits, nevertheless, fall. Figures 11 and 12 consider how the
credit and quantitative easing policies fare when there is a default risk shock. We ﬁnd that credit
easing is no longer as effective as when default risk remains at the steady state (see Figure 8).
Indeed, after three periods, the net effect of the default risk shock is virtually zero. This sug-
gests that, for credit easing to be an effective policy under the circumstances, the central bank
has to implement it in a very aggressive fashion. Turning to quantitative easing, spreads are
now higher. Hence, it now seems clear that quantitative easing is inappropriate when ﬁnancial
markets are under stress. Moreover, a quantitative easing policy has the effect of producing a
reduction in credit in the economy. Further, robustness tests (shown in the appendix) demon-
strate that the foregoing conclusions are unchanged even when we change the cost of central
bank intermediation.
6. Conclusions
This paper has considered some of the challenges faced by the standard optimizing model that
macroeconomists and central banks use to assess the implications of various policies. In par-
ticular, we propose a strategy that incorporates credit frictions into what has come to be known
as the canonical model (e.g., Woodford (2003)). The model used by C´ urdia and Woodford, in a
series of recent papers, serves as the basis for attempting to mimic the behavior of credit spreads
duringmoderateaswellascrisistimes. Weareabletogeneratemovementsinourrepresentative
credit spreads that are, at times, both sharp and volatile. Next, we consider some experiments
to determine the impact of two approaches to monetary policy making implemented during the
recent global ﬁnancial crisis, namely, quantitative easing and credit easing. It is found that their
impact on credit spreads is dissimilar and this suggests that policy makers need to be able to
quickly identify the source of the ﬁnancial shock if they are to successfully address extreme
stresses to the ﬁnancial system. In other words, while the model is able to generate different
predictions about the short-term effects of pursuing quantitative versus credit easing policies,
and their effectiveness at inﬂuencing spreads in the desired direction, the simulations are infor-
mative about the root cause of a ﬁnancial crisis only if it arises from a change in the loan default
rate. Clearly, experimenting with different types of ﬁnancial shocks might well permit a more
precise diagnosis of changes in certain spreads. It is also worth noting that debt dynamics inFinancial Frictions and Credit Spreads 15
the model are such that total credit to GDP in the economy is not as persistent as it is in the re-
alized data. Alternatively, we may wish to modify the intermediation cost technology to permit
intermediaries to fail, or households to default on their loans. Failing that, alternative proxies
for the largely unobservable intermediation costs should be considered. Changing the inﬂation
target in the version of the Taylor rule used here is another modiﬁcation we could make. For
example, there is evidence that a more robust rule is obtained if changes in the output gap, or
the rate of change in output, replace the level of the output gap. Finally, the current exercise
would be more meaningful still by asking whether, if the results derived here are taken to the
data, there is support for the interpretation of credit spreads put forward in this paper.16 Ke Pang and Pierre L. Siklos
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Appendix
Table 1: List of Parameters - Benchmark
 0:75  0:9512
 0:1 b 1:2177
b 12:5 b 2:3044
s 2:5 s 1:6937
 1:5 1 0:02
y 0:5 2 1
s 1  Z 1
 0:9  g 0:15
b 0:5   0:3
s 0:5
Table 2: Simple OLS Tests - Benchmark
!10y3m !3mfed !pfed !ba
! :585 :5861  :06415  :2089
(0:041) (0:000) (0:803) (0:043)
constant :2939  1:7323 1:9752 1:4045
(0:612) (0:000) (0:001) (0:000)
Table 3: Pairwise Correlations - Benchmark




! 0:8042 0:4577 1
(0:0000) (0:0016)
!g  0:1034  0:2904 0:0402 1
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